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INTRODUCTION: LITERATURE, LIFE, AND THE
LAW
Joel M. Gora*
If a man were permitted to make all the ballads, he need not care who
should make the laws of a nation.'
The currents of law and literature that met in this Sympo-
sium and brought together prominent academic commentators,
practicing attorneys, and well-known authors had a rather un-
usual genesis: a nude group therapy session in California. A def-
amation suit was brought by the psychologist who conducted the
session against an author who had attended it and who thereaf-
ter wrote a novel that described a similar nude encounter session
in an unflattering way. In a footnote to its 1979 opinion, Bin-
drim v. Mitchell,2 the California appellate court observed: "The
fact that 'Touching' was a novel does not necessarily insulate
Mitchell [the author] from liability for libel, if all the elements
of libel are otherwise present."3 The court went on to hold that
the author was properly found liable for defaming the
psychologist.
The decision in Bindrim sent a mild tremor through the le-
gal community. The decision was unusual for two reasons. First,
a claim of defamation against the author of a fictional work was
atypical. Traditional defamation and privacy actions against me-
dia defendants ordinarily involve purportedly factual publica-
tions. Second, because the defamation arose from a purportedly
nonfactual publication, a finding of liability based on an inten-
tional or reckless disregard for the truth was inherently paradox-
ical. The judicial outcome is somewhat less surprising when one
considers that the author, prior to attending the therapy session,
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School
'Remark attributed to Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun, Conversation Concerning a
Right Regulation of Government for the Common Good of Mankind (1703) (unpublished
manuscript), quoted in THE OxFoR DiCONARY oF QUOTATIoNs 208 (2d ed. 1953).
2 92 CaL App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
1 Id. at 73 n.2, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35 n.2.
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had expressly disclaimed any intention to write about it and had
stipulated that what transpired in the session would remain con-
fidential. These facts, however, made the result seem no less
threatening to the literary community. 4 When the Supreme
Court, in a widely publicized order, declined to review the judg-
ment,5 and the Justices sympathetic to media concerns dis-
sented,' it seemed that a new danger to literary freedom had
been let loose.
Soon after the Bindrim ruling, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Geisler v. Petrocelli,7 simi-
larly held that a young woifan, whose name was identical to the
female transsexual "heroine" of a potboiler novel, could sue the
book's author for defamation.8 The fact that the plaintiff and
the author had worked together briefly in a small publishing
firm before the novel was written - reminiscent of the prior en-
counter in Bindrim - made the result seem less startling. Once
again, however, an author of fiction had paradoxically been
found to have brushed too close to, yet veered too far from,
reality.
The following year, a contestant in the Miss America Pag-
eant, a former baton-twirling Miss Wyoming, won a $26,500,000
jury verdict in a defamation action against Penthouse magazine.
The short story that gave rise to the action in Pring v. Pent-
house International, Inc.9 portrayed a supposedly fictional ba-
ton-twirling Miss Wyoming who engaged in fantastic sexual ex-
ploits during a Pageant that was televised coast to coast.10 The
outcome of the trial in Pring indicated that the new danger to
literary freedom, only signaled by earlier defamation-in-fiction
cases, had emerged as a full-blown first amendment problem.1
Again, the apprehension felt by those concerned with literary
4 See generally Louis, Libel in Fiction: A Chilling Decision for Authors, 6 ART & L.
3-5 (1980) (reviewing Bindrim v. Mitchell).
" 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
6 Id. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall voted to grant certiorari.
7 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980).
1 Id. at 639 (allegations that reasonable person could associate plaintiff with fic-
tional character having identical name and physical description determined to be suffi.
cient to withstand motion to dismiss).
9 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3112 (1983).
20 Id. at 440-41.
1 Or "Problem," as Professor Schauer skeptically put it. See Schauer, Liars, Novel-
ists, and the Law of Defamation, 51 BROoKLYN L. Rav. 233, 235 (1985).
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freedom was not ameliorated by the fact that the defendant-au-
thor had actually attended the Miss America Pageant at which
the real Miss Wyoming performed, nor by the fact that the ap-
pellate court ultimately overturned the judgment by a two-to-
one vote on the ground that the story was too fantastic to have
reasonably been taken as "true.1 2 Such a "mega-verdict," cou-
pled with the narrow reversal on appeal, is the stuff of which a
"chilling effect"1 3 is created.
To be sure, some of the chill might dissipate when one real-
izes that from a first amendment test case perspective, the facts
in Bindrim, Geisler, and Pring were less than noble. Certainly,
these are not the sort of cases that would directly threaten the
publication of works by the likes of Hemingway. Moreover, the
recent "rash" of defamation-in-fiction cases has indeed been
small.1' However, the analytical and doctrinal difficulties posed
for the courts by these few cases have been considerable. This
result is understandable given the unsettled nature of contempo-
rary defamation law and the difficulty of neatly fitting the defa-
mation-in-fiction action into that structure. 5
Current defamation law is predicated on two polar premises:
first, opinion is protected under the first amendment because
"there is no such thing as a false idea"; but second, "there is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact."17 A work of
fiction, however, does not fit neatly into either the category of
opinion or that of false speech. Fiction conveys and expands
ideas, but it does not normally communicate the kind of opinion
whose truth is best tested by "the competition of other ideas.""'
At the same time, although fiction is usually rich in factual de-
12 Pring, 695 F.2d at 443.
13 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (penal statutes in first amend-
ment area that are "susceptible of sweeping and improper application," NAA.C.P. v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963), may inhibit exercise of first amendment rights by those
who seek to avoid prosecution; chilling effect may derive from "the fact of the prosecu-
tion, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure").
1" See Franklin, Fiction, Libel, and the First Amendment, 51 BnoomyN L. Rv.
269, 270 & n.7 (1985).
15 For a complete discussion of these issues, see LeBel, The Infliction of Harm
Through the Publication of Fiction: Fashioning a Theory of Liability, 51 BRooLyN L.
REv. 281 (1985). Cf. Zimmerman, Real People in Fiction: Cautionary Words About
Troublesome Old Torts Poured Into New Jugs, 51 BROOKLYN L. Rzv. 355 (1985).
Is Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339.40 (1974).




tail, the very nature of the genre precludes characterizing a work
of fiction as containing "statements of fact."
While false statements of fact are unprotected, modern libel
law seeks to avoid the deadening hand of self-censorship by be-
ing anchored in the notion that journalists should not be re-
quired to publish at the peril of being held strictly liable for fac-
tual errors. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has determined that
journalism requires strategic protection against such liability.
Thus, it has fashioned the well-known requirements that false
statements made by media defendants are actionable only if the
statements are the product of "actual malice" - intentional or
reckless falsity - when the plaintiff is a "public official"1" or
"public figure" 20 or if the statements are, at a minimum, the
product of negligence when the plaintiff is a "private" individ-
ual.2 1 The much-publicized, recent libel suits brought by Gener-
als Sharon and Westmoreland provide classic, although cumber-
some, examples of the way in which the safeguards of the actual
malice requirements operate. But here too, as with the opinion/
fact dichotomy, defamation in fiction does not fit comfortably
into the "actual malice" construct.
To the contrary, bringing and defending such an action re-
quires a kind of mutual "doublethink." 22 On the one hand, the
plaintiff must assert simultaneously that the story or novel is
"about" him or her to the extent that there are similarities be-
tween the plaintiff and the fictional character but "could not be
about" the plaintiff because, in real life, he or she would never
do the scandalous things ascribed to the character. 23 The plain-
tiff's case thus becomes: "It's me, but it couldn't be me." Simi-
larly, on the author's side, the defense must assert that a fic-
tional portrayal - something that purports to convey no literal
truth - was not knowingly, recklessly, or negligently untrue.
Moreover, fitting defamation in fiction into the "actual malice"
construct appears to defeat one of the important advances in li-
bel law. Modern libel law shifts the inquiry from the writer's
attitude toward the plaintiff - measured by common law "mal-
10 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
'0 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
21 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 & n.10 (1974).
22 "Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one's mind
simultaneously, and accepting both of them." G. ORwnL, 1984, at 176 (Signet ed. 1949).
" See, e.g., Pring, 695 F.2d at 442-43; text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
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ice," that is, the writer's ill will toward the plaintiff - to the
writer's attitude toward the truth - measured by "actual mal-
ice," that is, the writer's knowing or reckless disregard for the
truth.24 The gist of the defamation-in-fiction tort, however,
seems to invite a return to the treacherous problems of the old
inquiry: Was the writer out to "get" the plaintiff?.
It is not at all surprising, given these contradictions and
anomalies, that the courts have been in a quandary over the is-
sues raised by the need to measure defamation-in-fiction claims
against a first amendment yardstick. Furthermore, although the
litigated cases in this area have been few in number, their poten-
tial impact on doctrine and attitudes is great.
In doctrinal terms, given the primacy of the first amend-
ment, important questions are raised whenever a mode of ex-
pression is sought to be regulated on the basis that it causes un-
acceptable harm to individual or social interests. In some
instances, these questions, once resolved, do not linger. This
phenomenon is well-illustrated by the Supreme Court's holding
that a state, in the interest of protecting children, can regulate
the distribution of pornography that depicts children. 25 Such
relatively bright line doctrines, however, have not been formu-
lated to resolve with finality the questions that have surrounded
defamation law since it was first constitutionalized by the Su-
preme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan0 - a decision
that embodies "the central meaning of the first amendment"
and that has been hailed as perhaps "the best and most impor-
tant [opinion the Court] has ever produced in the realm of free-
dom of speech. '27 In this area of the law, the continuing effort to
2, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971) (ill will toward plain-
tiff not an element of "actual malice"); see also Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler,
398 U.S. 6, 10 (1970) (judge erred in defining malice as "spite, hostility or deliberate
intention to harm"); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 71-75 (1964) (truth defense not
negated by defendant's intent to inflict harm).
25 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). In Ferber, the Supreme Court held that
states could ban the distribution of nonobscene child pornography because the first
amendment value in such a mode of expression is "exceedingly modest, if not de mini-
mus." Id. at 762. A state's compelling interest in preventing the sexual exploitation and
abuse of children, therefore, was found powerful enough to place materials ahowing chil-
dren engaged in sexual activity basically outside the scope of the first amendment. Id. at
763-64.
' 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the
First Amendment," 1964 Sup. C. l~v. 191, 194.
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fashion rules to accommodate both expression and reputation is,
indeed, a worthwhile enterprise. Moreover, to the extent that
the rules that courts tentatively and haltingly try to formulate
seem to provide awkward and inadequate protection for either
individual worth or literary freedom, there is even greater reason
to pursue this enterprise.
As many of the participants in the Symposium indicated,
the handful of defamation-in-fiction cases seem to have had, in
practical terms, a palpable effect on authors and their counsel.
Professor Schauer, in his provocative reference to "The Dog
That Didn't Bark,"28 suggests that despite the perceptions of au-
thors and their counsel, the law is not being used to suppress
worthwhile expression or penalize unwitting misrepresentation.
After careful analysis, he concludes with a corollary principle:
Let sleeping dogs, or at least those that don't bark, lie. Other
participants in the Symposium take sharp issue with this assess-
ment. As stated by Victor Kovner, the dog barks not only when-
ever suit is filed, but whenever an editor alters or deletes por-
tions of the text of an author's manuscript for fear of litigation.2
An increase in defamation-in-fiction litigation certainly may
chill the publication of traditional fiction, particularly the roman
& clef, as well as the newer forms of fiction referred to variously
as "docudrama" or "faction. '3 0
Finally, these doctrinal and practical questions must be
evaluated against the much larger and more profound issue of
the contribution of fiction and literature to our very understand-
ing of the world. The law will undoubtedly continue to wrestle
with whether individuals apparently harmed by fictional por-
trayals should be able to invoke defamation theory or alternative
tort theories to redress the hurt allegedly caused by creators and
publishers of fiction. The effort to balance the concerns of these
individuals, however, against the need to protect creators of fic-
tion, by providing the first amendment "breathing space" 31 nec-
28 See Schauer, supra note 11, at 241.
29 Remarks of Victor Kovner at the Brooklyn Law School Symposium on Defama-
tion in Fiction (Oct. 20, 1984).
30 These different genres are described in Anderson, Avoiding Defamation Problems
in Fiction, 51 BROoKLYN L. REv. 383, 393 nn.56-57 (1985).
31 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973) (any restrictions on first amend-




essary to the practice of their craft, surely will proceed from a
premise, whether stated or silent, that is based on assessments
about the worth of fiction itself. Most of the participants in this
Symposium make their arguments against the background of
such value judgments. Indeed, first amendment adjudication in-
evitably involves such judgments. New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 2 for example, is predicated on the sense that citizen criti-
cism of government is so important that it merits extensive,
though not absolute, first amendment protection.ss
Whether creators of fiction or faction can credibly make a
similar claim for their works, thereby entitling such works to a
comparable level of protection, depends, at least in part, on ad
hoc determinations. To make such judgments, courts inevitably
must address questions such as how much Harriet Beecher
Stowe contributed to our understanding of slavery, Charles
Dickens to our understanding of capitalism, Edwin O'Connor to
our understanding of northern politics, Robert Penn Warren to
our understanding of southern politics, John Steinbeck to our
understanding of the depression, Alexander Sozhenitsyn to our
understanding of totalitarianism, and William Styron to our un-
derstanding of tyranny.
Ultimately, of course, such judgments are made by history.
Meanwhile, however, judges, lawyers, and commentators con-
fronted with real claims and defenses must, at least tentatively,
reach conclusions about harm and value and protection in order
to dispose of the respective business at hand. This Symposium
makes a significant and meaningful contribution to those efforts.
' 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See id. at 270 (stating that debate on public issues must be "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open").
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